

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

Views of the Count de Paris.

A Remarkable Article by the Head of the House of Orleans—Prussian Supremacy and its Danger to Europe—A Sharp Review of the Policy of Bismarck.

About a year after the close of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 a remarkable article, entitled "Germany and its New Political Tendencies" appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes, the leading Orleanist journal of Paris. This article was written in the guise of a letter from a French traveller, and was published under the sponsorship of Mr. E. Foreade, one of the editors of the Revue, who called attention to it not only as the first dissertation published on "New Germany," but for its ingenious discrimination and scrupulous sincerity. It was understood at the time that it was written by the Count de Paris, the head of the House of Orleans, and created a great sensation not only on that account, but by reason of the bold views which it advanced. At the present crisis the article in question possesses unusual interest, and we therefore present a translation of it entire, as follows:—

I write you in fulfillment of my promise to give you my views on Germany, but my journey through the country has been so hurried, and my impressions, in many respects, so vague, I might almost say so contradictory, that I fear I may exceed the reasonable limits of a letter. The people here have, in fact, not yet quite calmed down from the excitement into which they have been thrown by the events of last year. Situations, ideas, even principles, have been so confounded, that scarcely any one seems to have made up his mind whether the new order of things should be looked upon with favor or disfavor.

RESULTS OF THE BATTLE OF SADOWA. One thing, however, is accepted as an accomplished fact—the unity of Germany under the supremacy of Prussia. Whether willingly or unwillingly, every one submits to this. A diversity of action and interests among the States has become a thing of the past, and will henceforth take its place beside the historic records of the Germanic empire and its ancient constitution. Doubtless the unity of Germany is not yet complete; it is certainly not definitively established. Still there is nothing to warrant us in concluding that the Southern States will not, in due course, enter into the bosom of the Germanic nation, and the Germanic possessions of the House of Austria have, at no distant day, their legitimate weight in its councils. Prussia decapitated at Sadowa the hundred-headed hydra with which the people had been content to bear since the days of Lafontaine, and victorious, although unaided, vied after it in its train the whole Germanic body with its hundred-tailed dragon. Such brilliant success fascinated all Germans. It was less the triumph over Prussia which delighted them than the combination of force and audacity which characterized the policy of her statesmen and the strategy of her generals. They compared these rare qualities with the inertness, imprudence, and gloomy anticipations of the Court of Vienna, and with the sheer impotence of the Germanic Diet; and their love of Fatherland, which in later years had suffered such humiliations, made them cry out "There is our guide!"

CAUSES OF BISMARCK'S POPULARITY. It is scarcely possible for a Frenchman to estimate how much Germanic self-love has had to endure for many years. Up to 1849 the liberal movement, at first under a legal form, and afterwards revolutionary in character, had been the expression of their aspirations for unity. Since that time it has been suppressed, whilst Germany has in vain aspired to that dignity abroad which despotic governments never fail to promise their submissive subjects. Every time that a great European question found its solution without Germany being consulted they regarded themselves as personally insulted. During the Crimean war their sympathies were with us; but they saw their influence neutralized, owing to the antagonism of Prussia and Austria. Subsequently, in 1859, they wished to interfere against us, but it required months to put the wheels of the Confederation in motion, and when they were ready to act, Austria, always jealous of Prussia, deprived them of the opportunity by signing the peace of Villafranca. Since, however, Bismarck was placed at the head of affairs, Germans have felt there was such a thing as a German policy to be recognized. From this source sprang that statesman's popularity. The Holstein question, stripped of the legal forms which had hitherto encompassed it, was clearly placed before them as an object of national ambition, and was solved by force of arms in spite of the protestations of almost all Europe. Indifferent to the mode in which it was effected, the Germans hailed its violent solution as a clear revenge for the treaties of 1814 and 1815. There was henceforth political Germany; but who shall be its representative? Austria, as ambitious though less powerful than Prussia, pretends to take that position. That it might not leave that role to its rival, it closed the struggle with France after the battle of Solferino; made a great effort at Frankfurt to place itself at the head of the movement for a united Germany; and, in 1864, entered into an understanding with Prussia to discard the Germanic Diet as a cloak already too much worn to cover any longer the two attitudes who fought under its folds. The time has come for them to engage in the inevitable struggle. Upon the day when the forces of these two adversaries encountered each other, the German Confederation, shaken by their strokes, fell to the ground, and the battle of Sadowa definitively broke up the equilibrium upon which Germanic interests had hitherto depended. Since then M. de Bismarck has been able to give Germans that which they most of all ambitioned—the satisfaction of seeing themselves taken into account in the affairs of Europe. The haughty manner of Prussia, inseparable to the Germans themselves when they were forced to submit to it, flattered their pride when they found it practised towards other nations. Formerly, a citizen of Thuringia, or of one of the principalities of Reuss, felt himself humiliated

in the presence of Frenchmen or Russians, believing them elevated so far above him by the greatness of their nation. To-day, while cherishing a vague, poetic affection for his own limited territory, he is proud to bear the burden of a federal government, which makes its influence felt in the councils of Europe, believing himself rendered thereby much more worthy, personally, of inspiring consideration, respect, or fear. Those even who have lost much by the formation of the new confederacy share this feeling, and find it a compensation for the sacrifices they have been forced to make.

SHALL GERMANY BE PRUSSIANIZED? The unity of Germany must, then, be regarded as consummated; but will Germany absorb Prussia, or will Prussia absorb Germany? Such is the important question which now turns up. By Prussia we mean the Prussian government with its bureaucratic traditions and its old absolutist principles, together with its army, which, although recruited in a manner somewhat democratic, is commanded by a body of officers essentially aristocratic—a government active and intelligent, but formal and despotic in desire, and greatly disposed to range itself under the standards of the school of "Cesarism." By the Prussian people we are to understand the best educated in Europe, active and industrious, possessing in the highest degree the spirit of association, and appearing little likely to become consolidated under a government so far from being conformable to their manners and feelings.

GERMAN FEDERAL FEELINGS. Federation in Germany has been a failure. The spirit of federalism exists there under the pedantic name "particularism." It represents not only ideas and traditions, but above all powerful and varied interests. It constitutes the local life and preservation of those numerous centres of intelligence and policy which have largely contributed to the progress of Germany. It exists even in Prussia, for a Westphalian or a citizen of the Rhenish provinces has nothing of the Prussian about him except the name and uniform which he adopts in the service of King William. They are very sectional and at the same time very German, and although the Prussian administration has as yet permitted them to retain, contrary to the advice of centralizers, the laws they inherited from France, they see nothing in the rule under which they are placed except a disagreeable change, and look forward with anxiety to the time when the name of Prussian shall give way to that of German.

Our future relations with the most powerful of those nations which border France will depend upon the way in which this question will be solved between Prussia and Germany. Should Germany absorb Prussia, then the centre of Europe would belong to a nation whose interests, habits, and ideas tend towards the support of liberal institutions, who will probably set us an example in this respect, or certainly follow us with enthusiasm, should we fortunately precede them. It would form a social body possessing all the requisites for making a free people, but having interests too diverse to be ever aggressive—a nation probably more military and less bellicose than ours. Its internal prosperity developed, and its legitimate influence recognized abroad, would in time become the pledges of peace in the future. I think we should accept such a result with a good grace, although we might feel some regret for the extinction of its ancient landmarks. We certainly should prefer such an arrangement to a division, pure and simple, of Germany between Prussia and Austria, as this would have the effect of placing on our frontiers two powers always ready to compromise us in their quarrels, or unite against us, lest the one might appear to be less German than its rival.

THE DANGER TO GERMANY OF PRUSSIAN ASCENDANCY.

On the other hand, the absorption of Germany by Prussia would be the establishment of "Cesarism" in Central Europe. The onerousness of the rule, so contrary as it would be to German feelings, the numerous interests it would trample upon, the necessity it would feel placed under of quieting liberal aspirations by flattering the people with exaggerated ideas of national importance, would all combine in obliging it to adopt towards other nations a restless, threatening, and aggressive policy. It would at all times be a standing danger to the peace of Europe and a serious obstacle to the cause of liberty.

POLICY OF BISMARCK TOWARDS THE MINOR STATES.

In what sense, then, will this question be solved? Without pretending to foretell its future solution, one can indicate the different elements which exist. The Prussian system has in its favor the prestige of success, the right of victory, confidence in the future, and the dissension which exists among all those parties who are opposed to it. The success of M. de Bismarck has not only disorganized parties in Prussia but in all Germany. That minister sapped the foundation of the party even which he represented. One can easily imagine the aversion of the Prussian legitimists for the tortuous policy of such a statesman as he; but, then, obedience to the King being their leading principle, when they found M. de Bismarck sustained by him, they felt it their duty to follow his guidance. Hostile to all that they designate as revolutionary, hostile to the Italian Kingdom, hostile to the aggrandizement of Prussia, which must weaken their particular influence, they have seen themselves ignored by him whom they themselves had carried into power. M. de Bismarck then turned upon the liberal party, taking out of their hands the arms with which up to that time they had combated. During three years he had braved with impunity the Chamber of Deputies, in which the liberals had a majority. It made no response except by ineffectual words to a Minister who trapped upon its constitutional privileges. Regarding liberal ideas as a disease of which the nineteenth century was the victim, he nevertheless recognized the necessity of flattering this mania, and to accomplish this he chose the hour of his triumph. The day after the battle of Sadowa, when the country, still under the excitement of war feeling, had refused its suffrages to men who up to that time had constantly advocated their rights, one could see M. de Bismarck going in to demand from the Parliament a bill of indemnity. It was a retrospective homage by which the Prussian Minister purchased the subservience of his former adversaries. The bill was passed, and a step further taken—a large donation granted in his favor. Going still farther in that direction, he made an appeal to universal suffrage for the election of members. By this means he disarmed the liberals. Accustomed as they had been to fruitless and abstract discussions, they were incapable of distinguishing between forms and principles, and had so abused the words "universal suffrage" and "national unity" that they were unable to see how much captivated the audience was in the proceedings of the Prussian Prime Minister. The party which called itself liberal and national found itself

almost entirely under his control. The powerful association of the National Verein became in the hands of M. de Bismarck a blind and ready instrument for his purposes. At the same time he endeavored to cut up by the root those governments which, by giving them certificates of their continued existence, he induced to enter into the new Confederation. He destroyed their popularity by imposing upon them the same military charges as were laid on the Prussian provinces. The minor German States thus found their expenses almost trebled at one stroke. The duchy of Saxe-Coburg had entered into a convention with Prussia, some years before, for a military contingent, paying annually to Prussia 80 thalers or 300 francs for the support of each of its men; but this figure was a reduction accorded the duchy as a sort of indemnity to others, when Prussia still dreaded Austria's outbidding her for influence with them. To-day Prussia requires from the duchy 170 thalers or 637 francs 50 centimes for the same support. The contingent imposed by the Germanic Confederation upon the grand duchy of Saxe about 240,000 thalers, or 900,000 francs a year; to sustain the new military state will entail upon it an expense of 800,000 thalers, or 3,000,000 francs. The small German Governments had known how to conciliate the population by letting them escape those crushing charges which pressed so heavily on their more powerful neighbors. The first aim of Prussia has been to deprive them of this advantage, and this reason for their continued existence.

AVERSION OF THE MINOR STATES TO THEIR ABSORPTION BY PRUSSIA.

In the midst of such a state of things, the Prussian system, confiding in the force of its organization, presents itself as a necessity which is imposed upon Germany. It will have, however, to contend against two movements, quite dissimilar, but equally opposed to its domination, the one in the North, which is averse to centralization, the other in the South, which contemplates a new confederation.

The nature of the former is easily explained. The present position of Germany satisfies its national self-love. This position gained, it does not see the necessity of sacrificing all its traditions and local institutions, its particular interests, to the uniformity of the Prussian system. Those who have the most ardent desire to see Prussian hegemony established, find it advisable not to touch the matter further at present. Annexation, pure and simple, has to-day fewer partisans in the smaller States than it had when they entered, willingly or unwillingly, into the Confederation of the North. They know that their capitals would lose by becoming Prussian sub-prefectures. The universities, even, although they have always been the chief glory of the desire for unity, do not wish to lower their flag before Berlin, whilst in the armies of these States you will find sentiments of jealousy and sometimes of rancor against the Government. In fine, the members of these administrations are fully aware that the result of such a change would be to remove them from their present position, and prevent them from occupying other than inferior places, leaving the more important to functionaries of Prussian origin. So far as the masses are concerned, they hesitate. Prussia seems to say to them, "Since you have to bear all the burdens of Prussian subjects, is it not better you should participate in all the advantages?" but they dread the despotic tendencies of the Prussian system, which would be every kind which it has had to encounter in the provinces it annexed are not encouraging to the friends of annexation in the adjacent countries. There does not exist, in fact, in the minor states of the Confederation of the North that great administrative machinery necessary for the establishment of a centralized despotism, nor will it be established either easily or rapidly.

SHALL THERE BE A SOUTHERN GERMANIC CONFEDERATION?

Opinion tends in a contrary direction in the Southern States of Germany, upon whom the isolation in which they have been placed by the treaty of Prague weighs heavily. The "Line of the Main," traced in all sincerity by M. de Bismarck, who was afraid of diluting the Prussian element, has never been regarded as a serious proceeding by the Germans. It would not have been possible except with Prussian factions on the bank of the river and Austrians on the other; but the power of Austria once got rid of, the stipulations of Prague were for the South nothing more than a sort of penance, a stake at piquet, as collegians say, from which sooner or later they must be relieved. Would the people of the States of the South be able to contend against the military power of Prussia by making themselves the champions of the "liberal cause" in Germany, and imitating the Swiss and Belgians, who, placed by the side of powerful neighbors, have compensated for their material inferiority by the superiority of their institutions? This is doubtful. A certain amount of wind is necessary to float a flag—even the flag of liberty—and no breath of air would come to unfold that which the States of the South would raise in the face of Prussia. In no case, however, have their governments dreamt, for a moment, of trying so hazardous an experiment. The Germany of the North and that of the South must, in fact, become one and the same nation. It is not the question of religion which divides them.

GERMANY, NORTH AND SOUTH, MUST ULTIMATELY BE ONE.

Take, for example, the Valley of the Rhine and the adjacent provinces; in the South, the country of Baden, Darmstadt, and Wurtemberg are chiefly Protestant, while, in the North, Westphalia and the Rhenish Provinces are almost entirely Catholic. The south of Germany lives by the means of its connection with the north. Its quasi capitals, Karlsruhe, Stuttgart and Munich; its imperial cities, Ratisbon, Augsburg, and even independent Heidelberg; its sole University of Heidelberg, do not suffice to give it an independent existence. In a commercial point of view, the South would have no advantage in separating from the North, with its great and prosperous cities, the centres of industry and the openings for maritime enterprise; it would be still less desirable in an intellectual point of view, for from thence it derives all its inspirations. All these are inducements for the South to unite itself with the North; it wishes it at any price, and is for the time being content to accept the supremacy of Prussia rather than remain situated as it is at present. The hasty demand for a rectification of the frontier, addressed by France to Prussia in August last, has sufficed to make the Governments of the South feel how much they need the protection of the latter power, and the necessity of concluding with it such an alliance as will place all their military forces at its disposal. When the question of reconstructing the Zollverein was agitated, rather than renounce it, the southern States accepted all the

conditions of Prussia; among others the veto which it had reserved in the future customs congress. That customs union is only a temporary arrangement preparatory to the intimate union of North and South. Berlin has had the exceptional privilege of seeing itself possessing at the same time three parliaments, representing for the Prussian citizen three countries.—Its own particular country, Prussia; its political country, the Confederation of the North; and its great country, Germany, disguised under the name of the Zollverein. A platform like this cannot stand, even in Germany, and the Parliament of the Confederation will soon see itself seated on the benches of the representatives of all Germany. It is Prussia which to-day wishes to defer that moment. It is in haste to have the vote taken on the constitution of the new confederation, so that it may have only to discuss the question with that portion of Germany which has been already admitted, and have the power afterwards of imposing it as a whole on the States which will join it. The security, however, is not sufficient. The Government of Berlin cannot venture openly to oppose the movement which draws the South towards it, but it wishes to retard it until it has Prussianized its present confederates. It wishes to eat the artichoke leaf by leaf. It knows well that the admission of the Southern States would bring into the councils of the confederation such support to the resistance it has already to contend against, as, instead of being able to make the law, would compel it to submit. Looking at the matter from a French standpoint, we should wish, for the same reasons, to see the union completed as soon as possible. In fact, so far as European affairs are concerned, it is already effected by the treaties entered into, but still more by the force of circumstances. The Southern States now feel themselves obliged to be auxiliaries of Prussia in whatever war it chooses to inaugurate. By a political union with the South, Prussia would not gain an additional soldier, whilst it would find in such union a restraint upon, and a counterpoise to, its influence in directing the affairs of Germany.

IS GERMANY ANXIOUS FOR WAR?

But to the end that those elements of resistance may be able to organize and oppose the efforts which Prussia will make to absorb Germany, a foreign war does not seem necessary. Can we, however, hope for the maintenance of peace? The Luxemburg question put the matter clearly before us a few months ago, and caused all those who believed in it on the eve of a great war to give the matter serious consideration. A false step on the edge of the abyss makes all the difference between prudence and temerity. This has been exemplified in the case of England and the United States, who, having failed to quarrel over the Trent affair, have become more circumspect towards each other. At times, however, a people, ill at ease with themselves, feel anxious for a quarrel with their neighbors, as a diversion from their misery. Such is not, however, the disposition to-day of the people of Germany. They do not wish to see their country sold, but the sufferings it cannot be effaced by a dash of the pen. The victims of bullets and cholera have been numerous among all classes of society, and every household has been in mourning. The draft upon able-bodied men at that time affected agriculture, industry, and commerce to such an extent that the consequences are felt to this day. The prospect of a new war has become more repugnant to the Germans, since they have experienced in the last war the miseries which follow in its train. The thirst of battle which it is supposed to kindle in every soldier is no means general in German armies. The remembrance of that last campaign is still too fresh in the minds of those who then fought against the Prussians to make them desirous of serving to-day under their orders. So far as the Prussian army is concerned, it boasts less of Sadowa in 1867 than of Duppel in 1865; the reason being that, until the latter year, its valor, of which it felt a consciousness, was not generally recognized in Europe. It needed a chance of proving it, and had not found an opportunity of doing so since any great European war. The more meagre the laurels reaped in Denmark were the more it felt the need of proving to the world its valor. To-day, on the other hand, although it has gained a battle the most decisive since Waterloo, and is the point of aim for military men throughout the world, knowing at the same time by experience how great are the hazards of war, its language is changed. In fact, taking the German nation as a whole, those who hope for some advantage by a new struggle are greatly in a minority. Those who gained by late events wish for leisure to enjoy the fruits while those who suffered are anxious for the maintenance of peace as a means to repair their losses.

JEALOUSY OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE.

But if the Germans wish to accomplish in peace the work of completing their national "unity," they are, nevertheless, very jealous of any intermeddling with their internal affairs. The idea of seizing Alsace and Lorraine, or annexing Holland, has never been looked upon by them as other than a fancy originating in the brain of some professor of history; still they have also their "Monroe" doctrine. "Germany for the Germans," and whoever makes an attempt to appropriate any portion of this territory, which constitutes their "great country," or even interferes in their internal affairs, will be certain to make them all against him. This is a fact which it would be useless and absurd to dissimble. Of this susceptibility the Prussian Government can at any moment avail itself, and has had occasion for a quarrel. When M. de Bismarck, after having approved of the purchase of Luxemburg, freed himself from his pledge by alleging that German opinion was opposed to it, he was accused of bad faith, and some believed that such opinion was fictitious and improvised by himself to suit the occasion. In this instance he was calumniated; the explosion of feeling was real; it was, perhaps, the day when M. de Bismarck promised his consent that he was insincere, for he knew well that German sentiment would pronounce energetically on the point, and force him to break his desire.

THE CONVICTION THAT FRANCE DESIRES WAR.

The Luxemburg question has been settled. There are probably very few in Germany who look upon the evacuation of that fortress as a national humiliation; but the recollection of the matter has strengthened an idea long entertained in Germany, and which may one day or other become dangerous to the maintenance of peace; it is the conviction that the Emperor Napoleon has decided upon making war, and only awaits a fitting opportunity. This idea has taken firm hold of every person since 1859; previous to that time the author of the Crimean war had been looked upon as the champion of the oppressed, and the protector of Germany against Russia. The feebleness of the French government in 1860 did not shake this conviction; it was known to be not ready, and the Germanic distrust of it was soon confirmed by the vain

efforts of the Cabinet of the Tuilleries to acquire successively Mayence, Landau, or Luxemburg. The Germans, latterly much occupied with their own affairs, have known less about France for some years. The distinguished eloquence of M. Thiers has naturally attracted much attention beyond the Rhine, but the Germans have remembered little of his speeches except his remarks against the movement for German "unity," without thinking that they would have been, without doubt, very different, if the movement had not had force and violence as its auxiliaries; or taking into account the position in which the great orator was placed, or the rest of the discussion illustrated by his words. After having searched for the views of the Government in the articles in the Constitutionnel, the Germans believe they have found in the columns of some sheets lately issued in Paris what constitutes the universal sentiment of all shades of the liberal party in France. They have believed, and still believe, that the Emperor is personally anxious to make war on Germany, and that he is equally urged to do so by the bellicose passions of the French people, and they say then, if war be inevitable, it is better it should take place at once, it is better to make it short and decisive, and thus get rid of this state of inquietude, rather than purchase a temporary peace by concession to a neighbor upon whose good faith no reliance can be placed. Here there is no desire to provoke a war, but there is no spirit of conciliation to prevent it. Exploring all this, they resign themselves to it as a necessary evil, and when once commenced, that it may be finished soon, they will strike with passionate eagerness. Germany does not push M. de Bismarck into war; it would be even thankful if he avoided it, but it places in his hands the means of kindling it and sustaining it.

THE PEACE OF EUROPE DEPENDENT ON PRUSSIA.

The peace of Europe, then, depends to-day upon the interests of Prussian policy. What is that policy? M. de Bismarck wishes it to be believed that he used his influence to its utmost limits to prevent war from being declared in the case of Luxemburg. Even last year he tried to persuade the sovereigns deposed by Prussia that the plundering of them had been done by the orders of the King in spite of his remonstrances. With reference to this point it is somewhat difficult to separate what is farcical from what is true. But be it as it may, the motives which might have made him anxious for war in the spring and the reasons he may have had for questioning its prudence are easily understood. The condition of the Prussian forces, better prepared and armed, more numerous than ours, with the prestige of victory attached to them, and the desire to cement the "unity" of Germany by fire in a foreign war seemed to counsel him to precipitate the crisis. However, after much hesitation the Prussian Government felt desirous of peace. It felt that it would be oppressive to Germany to impose upon it so soon a new and great war. Once excited, public opinion, however, did not calm down until the instant when the conflict seemed imminent. The States of the South, pressed to sign the treaties of alliance, were by no means prepared to fulfill the stipulations. They had not yet transformed their military force, except by disorganizing it, and were not ready to take their part in an effective union. Hanover had suffered from an extensive conscription, to develop the presence of the French flag at the mouth of the Elbe appeared only needed. It would, doubtless, have proved abortive, or succumbed to the national sentiment, which was so hostile to foreign interference, but it was impossible not to see the symptoms of grave disasters in the event of meeting reverses. The avowed enemies of Prussia were those who then appeared most anxious for war, as if they expected a defeat on the Rhine and the overthrow of its domination. Here was matter for reflection, the war was avoided. The situation will be the same next year, and will have the same difficulties to meet, the same problems to solve. The States of the South will certainly be better organized, but their progress will not compensate for that of the French army during the same period. Prussia will have no greater interest in making war than it has had in the past three months; on the contrary, the reasons for avoiding it will be stronger. The Government will be perhaps led to it by a chain of events, but it is far from having resolved. War is then possible, but by no means certain; I hesitate to say even probable.

RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS IN PRUSSIA, AND DUTY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY.

If war, however, should be declared, it might overthrow the edifice of Prussian domination by undermining it; but its first effect would be to put an end to all resistance to that domination, and accomplish the union of North and South, not to the advantage of Germany, but solely to that of Prussia, as the representative of the national military power. If, on the other hand, owing to the maintenance of peace, and the prompt admission of the States of the South into the confederation, Germany might find itself sufficiently strong to hold its head above the Prussian system, and absorb Prussia, instead of being absorbed by it, it is in the name of and by means of liberal ideas alone that it could accomplish this fortunate result. It is only among the liberal party, reformed and strengthened, that the elements of resistance to Cesarism can rally. The party has been disorganized, but it has not for all that been destroyed; and in the midst of the conflict of so many diverse opinions and interests which the Constituent Assembly has faithfully reflected, their course is strictly defined. To form that assembly M. de Bismarck has had recourse to universal suffrage direct, of which he expected more favorable results than from the system adopted in the Prussian constitution. This mode of election, as is everywhere evident, the liberal party, reformed and strengthened, that the elements of resistance to Cesarism can rally. The party has been disorganized, but it has not for all that been destroyed; and in the midst of the conflict of so many diverse opinions and interests which the Constituent Assembly has faithfully reflected, their course is strictly defined. 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